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Summary  
  Trees continuously capture and store carbon. However, when destroyed 
(e.g., by fire), they release carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere. With the 
living carbon storage capacity of much of the world’s tropical forests diminishing 
at a rapid rate through deforestation and forest degradation, many believe that 
the reduction of emissions from deforestation and degradation of forests (REDD) 
must be a fundamental part of overall approaches to climate change mitigation. 
Avoiding deforestation, however, requires the introduction of financial mechanisms 
that make the retention of forests economically competitive.
  Efforts are currently under way to elaborate a scheme whereby credits could be 
issued for REDD and traded in the same way as carbon credits are traded under the 
clean development mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. Any REDD credit–generating 
system is likely to operate under the principles of the ministerial statement issued at 
COP14 in Poznan in December 2008. This incorporates: (1) development of transparent, 
collaborative, balanced, and inclusive international arrangements to support national 
REDD efforts; and (2) elaboration of a reliable framework to measure, report, 
and verify (MRV) emission reductions.
  The main challenges to the implementation of a viable REDD scheme are: 
(1) how to generate globally consistent emission reference scenarios at the 
country level from which to derive fully MRV’d REDD credits; and (2) elaboration 
of a “water-tight” financial mechanism whereby REDD credits, in the same way as 
carbon credits, could be issued and traded for avoided deforestation.
  While any REDD actions at national, regional, or project level would be tailored 
to maximize emission reductions, they should recognize the different ecological and 
social co-benefits of forests, namely: (1) the conservation of terrestrial biodiversity; 
(2) their important cultural, spiritual, and recreational roles in many societies; and 
(3) their contribution to the economic life of hundreds of millions of people.
  The establishment of an “International Emission Reference Scenario Coordination 
Center” (IERSCC) as a basis for deriving fully MRV’d REDD credits and an “International 
Emission Investment Reserve” (IEIR) to finance REDD activities are discussed here, 
along with the safeguarding of forest co-benefits under a REDD scheme.
As up to 20 percent 
of global anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions 
result from deforestation 
activities, the reduction of 
emissions from deforestation 
and degradation of forests 
(REDD) is a major theme of 
the ongoing negotiations 
under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
This briefing looks at 
the fundamental issues 
underlying REDD, as well 
as the challenges involved 
in current proposals to 
implement a trading scheme 
for REDD credits.
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Implementing a workable REDD scheme
REDD can be successful only if the reduction of emissions from 
forests can be made measurable, reportable, and verifiable, and 
if sufficient financial incentives are provided in a timely manner. 
Two international institutions for monitoring and financing as part 
of an overall fair, effective, and efficient overall framework for REDD 
are proposed here (see chart, p.3). They are intended to catalyze the 
current policy process by providing pragmatic and flexible solutions 
for the design and implementation of a REDD scheme.
Establishment of an “International Emission 
Reference Scenario Coordination Center” 
to set reference levels and verify emission 
reductions for REDD
As avoided deforestation and degradation in developing 
countries would be matched by financial compensation from 
Annex I countries, the first key requirement of any potential 
REDD mechanism, acceptable to both developing and developed 
countries under a market or fund mechanism, would be for 
REDD actions/credits to be based on measurable, reportable, 
and verifiable (MRV) data. This would include setting MRV’d 
reference levels (RL) to prevent parties (projects and/or countries) 
setting inflated baselines in order to generate more carbon credits 
for future emission reductions:
  The first step would be to establish national REDD reference 
levels in a fair, transparent, and efficient way as a basis for 
assessing future emission reductions. RL would be based on 
measurable indicators of country-specific drivers of deforestation, 
national circumstances, and historic deforestation rates—a multitude 
of methodologies for the collection and interpretation of forest 
area change, emission data, and deforestation drivers already exist. 
However, many developing countries still lack the necessary 
capacity to fulfill these requirements.
  To guarantee a streamlined application of REDD methodologies 
and data, the establishment of an International Emission Reference 
Scenario Coordination Center (IERSCC) is proposed. This would act 
as an independent global clearinghouse for harmonized data to be 
used in implementing reference level methodologies and in future 
REDD monitoring. The IERSCC would be tasked with collecting, 
reporting, and subsequent processing of Earth observation, 
deforestation- and degradation-driver information in a globally 
consistent manner. It would also assist, coordinate, and supervise 
the computation of national reference scenarios according to rules 
negotiated under the UNFCCC. National governments could request 
support, when needed, from the IERSCC in calculating their national 
RL and subsequent emission reductions.
  The IERSCC could serve as a central coordinating REDD 
capacity-building institution for monitoring and RL development in 
conjunction with other capacity building efforts such as the UN-REDD 
Programme. If possible, the IERSCC should be integrated into existing 
institutions like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) or the UNFCCC secretariat to limit its administrative burdens.
Establishment of an “International Emission 
Investment Reserve” to finance REDD
According to the Eliasch Review, the cost of halving net global CO2 
emissions from forests by 2030 is estimated at US$ 17–33 billion 
annually, but only if REDD is included in global emissions trading. 
However, simply adding avoided deforestation carbon credits to the 
existing carbon trading mechanisms threatens a flood of cheaper 
credits into global and linked domestic carbon markets due to the 
potentially high quantity and relatively low prices of REDD credits.
REDD carbon credits are estimated to emerge in the range of 
US$ 4–10 per tonne of carbon avoided. A 2007 study from the 
Woods Hole Research Center concluded that 94 percent of Amazon 
deforestation could be avoided at a cost of less than US$ 5 per tonne 
of carbon. These levels compare to the US$ 25 to US$ 35 per tonne 
current trading range of existing offset carbon credits. Thus if REDD 
credits were introduced to the global carbon market, industrialized 
countries could find it easy to fulfill most of their targets with cheap 
REDD. Moreover, both the potentially high quantity and low quality 
of REDD credits in the carbon markets could threaten the climate 
integrity of REDD and counter other climate protection targets:
“To guarantee a streamlined application of 
REDD methodologies and data, the establishment 
of an International Emission Reference Scenario 
Coordination Center is proposed.”
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  The establishment of an International Emission Investment 
Reserve (IEIR) is proposed to serve as a special form of investment 
fund for REDD. The IEIR would be a public investment scheme 
managed and administrated by a board of trustees consisting of 
investors and other relevant stakeholders. Its integration into 
existing international institutions such as the UNFCCC would 
be helpful in achieving legitimacy and avoiding administrative 
overburdening. The majority of capital for the IEIR would 
be provided by Annex I governments based on politically 
negotiated mandatory investment pledges to increase the 
trust in the scheme. Other investment sources would be 
flexible and could include private investments.
  The functioning of the IEIR can be described as follows:
  REDD providers (developing country governments and/or 
private carbon projects) auction their yet-to-be-created 
REDD units to the IEIR. The unit price would be below the 
carbon-market-credit value and possibly discounted because 
of implementation risk and measurement uncertainties. 
The price would also be influenced by the amount of 
co-benefits secured by the emission reduction units claimed.
  The auction mechanism in question is the second-price 
sealed-bid auction. Under this procedure, sellers of verified 
REDD credits would submit to the IEIR sealed bids proposing 
a minimum selling price per fixed unit or a maximum selling 
quantity per fixed price (the seller’s “best price”). The highest 
REDD bidder is able to buy the credits at the second-best 
selling price per fixed unit or the second-maximum selling 
quantity per fixed price (the “second-best offer”). This 
continues until the finance is exhausted or the targeted 
emission reduction quantity of the IEIR is reached. This 
auctioning approach can ensure that a fixed quantitative 
REDD supply cap is achieved in a competitive setting.
  The units are verified and then banked until market conditions 
are favorable for reselling them as fully fungible (interchangeable) 
MRV-based REDD credits to the carbon market. With many 
models projecting rising carbon credit prices, this will allow 
considerable reselling profits. To avoid market flooding the 
reselling can be conditional in terms of maximum number 
released per year, sufficient market demand, etc. The IEIR 
members would have an interest in reselling at higher market 
prices to increase revenue. Depending on its governing rules, 
the IEIR could act as a “central bank” to the carbon market 
controlling carbon price volatility.
REDD financing mechanism
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Tropical rainforest on the island of Fatu Hiva, Marquesas Islands, French Polynesia 











As aggressive use of REDD policies could run into conflict with basic 
food-security issues and ultimately harm the very environments that 
REDD is seeking to safeguard, the protection of forest co-benefits 
under a REDD scheme is paramount.
To make provision of the essential co-benefits of REDD attractive 
and cost-efficient, it is proposed that the provision of co-benefits 
could be used either as a qualifier criterion or as a pricing criterion 
for the auction:
  If the REDD units, although MRV’d, fail to meet sustainability 
requirements, they are excluded from the auction. The sustainability 
requirements would be based on quantified and certified amount of 
ecosystem value points—ideally negotiated under the umbrella of 
the relevant UN conventions and charters.
  Alternatively, a co-benefit factor scale from 0.5 to 1.5 could 
be established, under which the price of REDD units offered 
by the winning bidder would be increased by a factor of 1.5 
for maximum co-benefits or reduced by a factor of 0.5 for 
lowest possible co-benefit protection.
Conclusions
The new institutional arrangements outlined above could help overcome 
some of the deficiencies inherent in monitoring and financing schemes 
that currently hamper the effective inclusion of the forest sector 
as a critical component of carbon emissions mitigation strategies. 
However, the following factors must be taken into account:
  The methodology for setting RL and for assessing emission 
reductions must be carefully designed to prevent non-additional 
emission reductions (i.e., emissions that would have been 
reduced anyway) and an inflated supply of REDD credits—hence, 
the proposal for the International Emission Reference Scenario 
Coordination Center (IERSCC).
  The financing of REDD under an International Emission Investment 
Reserve would allow timely provision of large sums for REDD, enabling 
up-front financing for tackling deforestation in meaningful quantities. 
A powerful financing mechanism of this kind is needed for REDD to 
provide international resources without risking carbon market flooding.
  The use of the second-price sealed-bid auction, with an in-built 
system of co-benefit safeguards, would seem to offer the fairest 
method of assessing the price of units sold by REDD producers. 
It is hoped thereby to incentivize providers to provide a low unit 
price and high co-benefit performance.
  To reach these robust MRV standards, REDD readiness funding 
will be crucial in the coming years. The flexible structure of the IEIR 
will allow early and fluent phasing for this vital resource.
Further information 
This Policy Brief is based on work from the following two research 
projects funded by the European Commission under its sixth and 
seventh framework programs, and coordinated by IIASA:
  The GEOBENE (Global Earth Observation – Benefit Estimation: 
Now, Next and Emerging) project aims to develop methodologies 
and analytical tools to assess societal benefits of global earth 
observation in the domains of disasters, health, energy, climate, 
water, weather, ecosystems, agriculture, and biodiversity. 
More at: www.geo-bene.eu
  The CC-TAME (Climate Change: Terrestrial Adaptation & Mitigation 
in Europe) project concentrates on assessing the impacts of agricultural, 
climate, energy, forestry and other associated land-use policies 
considering the resulting feed-backs on the climate system in the 
European Union. More at: www.cctame.eu 
For in-depth information on the research summarized in this brief, see:
  Obersteiner M, Huettner M, Kraxner F, McCallum I, Aoki K, Boettcher H, 
Fritz S, Gusti M, Havlik P, Kindermann G, Rametsteiner E, Reyers B (2009). 
On fair, effective, and efficient REDD mechanism design. Carbon Balance 
and Management, 4:11 [doi:10.1186/1750-0680-4-11].
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